Comment: How Omar al-Bashir's 30-year legacy is playing out today Published on: 26 April 2023 Writing for The Conversation, Dr Willow Berridge explains how the legacy of Bashir鈥檚 rule is central to the latest round of conflict. , Since independence in 1956 the Sudanese have lived through 鈥� more than any other African country. When the 2019 uprising against long-time dictator created a military-civilian transitional government, the Sudanese hoped that their country would . But their hopes were dashed in October 2021 when Abdel Fattah al-Burhan against his civilian counterparts in the transitional government. In the latest round of conflict that began on , civil war looms as the security actors who benefited from Bashir鈥檚 downfall battle for supremacy. I have studied Sudanese politics for 15 years, and this latest round of conflict is the worst in the country鈥檚 recent history. And the legacy of Bashir鈥檚 rule is central to this calamity. Bashir to serve his regime. He chose conflict over compromise in dealing with politically marginalised groups in , in Sudan鈥檚 west, and in the south. He to hold on to power. This fuelled of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which was used to check regional rebels and the army. Bashir鈥檚 legacy has continued to play out today. His former allies have mobilised to block the transition to civilian rule. This had been promised to the Sudanese people under a signed in December 2022 by the military and a coalition of civilian actors. In my view, Burhan鈥檚 fear of civilian attempts to rein in military privileges led him to preserve key elements of the Bashir system. This is playing a divisive role in the current conflict. The ideology of Islamism Part of Bashir鈥檚 legacy has to do with Islamist politics. It鈥檚 this legacy that Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, better known as and who heads the paramilitary force, sought to exploit to his favour when he labelled Burhan a 鈥溾��. This characterisation was designed to . But it鈥檚 inaccurate. To understand why, one has to understand the ideological trajectory of the Bashir regime. When Bashir staged the coup in 1989, he was acting as a representative of a cell in a military carefully cultivated by the . The political party co-ordinated the coup with Bashir. The National Islamic Front was led by , who had run Sudan鈥檚 Islamic Movement since the 1960s. He had grown frustrated at his failure to introduce his version of Muslim law (Sharia), through parliamentary means. Soon after the coup, Bashir and Turabi initiated a process of tamkeen (empowerment). This policy, the legacy of which still remains, enabled them to give and security bosses willing to ally with them control over almost every part of public life in Sudan. Formally, Bashir installed an independent, technocratic government. In practice, however, power lay with a military-Islamist coalition that ran the country behind the scenes. Throughout the 1990s, Bashir set about ruthlessly purging Sudan鈥檚 independent civil society organisations and political parties. By the end of the decade, he鈥檇 fallen out with Turabi. He ejected Turabi from the government in 1999 and co-opted selected representatives of the opposition into his regime in the decades that followed. Bashir maintained the military-Islamist coalition as the basis of his National Congress Party. This kept the edifice built through tamkeen in place. Making amends In the 1990s, the Sudanese government hosted who sought to export revolution abroad and topple neighbouring regimes deemed to be Western proxies. However, after the split with Turabi in 1999, the Bashir regime attempted to by distancing itself from such militant groups. It also began to cooperate with Western intelligence agencies. In the later Bashir period, the the Saudi-Emirati coalition against the militant Islamist Houthis in Yemen. . When he emerged as the in 2019, Burhan benefited from the perception that he was a professional soldier more than an Islamist. His principal interests are aligned with the military鈥檚 core interests: maintaining its privileged social and political status, as well as its numerous business enterprises. Burhan made the in 2021 that National Congress Party-era security bosses and bureaucrats were his best allies in the battle to both prevent civilians challenging the military鈥檚 grip on the economy, and Hemedti鈥檚 Rapid Support Forces emerging as an alternative power centre. After taking over power, he co-opted these former security bosses into government. The Islamism of the Bashir-era stooges Burhan has been returning to government is three elements. These are socially conservative authoritarian politics, including the ; a hostility to the Sudanese left; and corruption. While these leaders are mostly not the 鈥渞adical Islamists鈥� the West fears, for many Sudanese, their ongoing commitment to a narrowly defined Arab-Islamic identity is divisive. A difficult dismantling After he seized power in 1989, Bashir insisted that his coup was a conventional military movement designed to return order to public life. Bashir, who has been in jail since April 2019, still that line. The military that overthrew him has been reading the same script. Four months after had removed Bashir, it signed a with the main civilian coalition, the Forces of Freedom and Change. This led to the formation of a joint military-civilian transitional government. The government established an Empowerment Removal Committee to of parastatal charities, media enterprises and banks that had enabled Bashir and his allies to maintain their grip on Sudan. But Burhan鈥檚 October 2021 coup disrupted this. The committee was pushed aside and most of its prominent members . But even before this coup, dismantling Bashir鈥檚 regime was an enormous challenge. The media is a case in point. In the Bashir period, the media was controlled by nominally independent proprietors. In practice, they were National Congress Party cronies, thriving off the party鈥檚 domination of the Sudanese economy. The notorious al-Intibaha newspaper, for instance, is known for its hostile rhetoric towards the South Sudanese. It continued to act as a platform for Bashir鈥檚 warmongering uncle, al-Tayyib Mustafa, even after Mustafa was for posing a threat to the transitional government. After , the paper retained his style. A published shortly before the April 2023 outbreak of conflict characterised the civilians in the 2019-2021 transitional government as dual nationals serving foreign interests. It attacked efforts to curtail the security services鈥� powers. Bashir may have fallen in 2019, but his military successors have preserved much of his regime鈥檚 infrastructure. The remnants of this continue to undermine democratic transition in Sudan, with ultimately disastrous consequences. , Lecturer in History, This article is republished from under a Creative Commons license. Read the . Share: Latest News 缅北禁地 recognised with geography award 缅北禁地 has been awarded the Highly Commended Geographical Association Publishers Award for its collaboration with Time for Geography, the UK鈥檚 open-access, dedicated video platform. published on: 16 April 2026 缅北禁地 historians mark General Strike centenary To mark the 100th anniversary of the British General Strike and miners鈥� lock-out of 1926, historians at 缅北禁地 are organising a series of events on its enduring legacy. published on: 16 April 2026 Comment: NCP is in administration Writing for The Conversation, Erwei (David) Xiang discusses how some big companies like NCP are so dependent on debt that they can鈥檛 adjust to change. published on: 16 April 2026 Facts and figures
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